The 2001 federal election posed significant challenges for the Coalition. Redistributions in Western Australia, New South Wales, Tasmania, the Northern Territory and South Australia left the Government with a notional majority, based upon the 1998 election results, of just six seats. A loss of three seats would have cost the Government its majority taking into account the loss of Ryan and defection of the member for Kennedy, Bob Katter. In addition the benefits of incumbency were lost in the seven seats where members were retiring. These included three high profile Ministers who were not recontesting.

Katter's defection from the National Party and the high profile candidacy of Tony Windsor in New England represented direct threats to the National Party's numbers as safe seats looked set for Independents. A difficult preselection in Ryan (which had been previously lost at the 17 March byelection) and the loss and necessary replacement of a high profile candidate in the key marginal seat of Ballarat added to the challenges the party faced.

In the 1998 election the Government was defending its position but in 2001 the Government had to run a defensive and counterattack strategy — to secure the seats already held and win seats from Labor. This was the only way of ensuring victory. The average two party preferred swing away from governments since 1987 has been around 2% — a swing that would have cost the Coalition fifteen seats. Additionally, since the war, only three Prime Ministers had won three elections in a row. In the end John Howard delivered the Coalition an historic win with a fourteen seat majority. The Liberal/National Party primary swing was 3.6% and on a two party preferred basis the just over 2% swing was the largest to an incumbent government since 1966.

Illegal immigrants

Much has been written about the Coalition victory and many myths have developed. Many commentators have claimed that the Government's victory was due only to the M V Tampa and the issue of illegal immigrants. This is wrong. The Tampa was a key campaign issue but to ascribe the entire win to this denies the Government's position in successive public opinion polls prior to it. According to the Newspoll taken 9-11 March the Coalition's primary vote was just 35% with Labor holding a 13% primary lead. Two months later, after the Budget was brought down, the Government led by 1%, and within two weeks following the Aston by-election in July the Government led Labor by 4% on a primary basis. Following Aston, the Liberal/National Party primary vote hit 40% and never fell below that critical threshold. Labor should have won Aston easily. The Aston by-election demonstrated that the Coalition was in a competitive position. It was a reflection of an improved standing that can be traced back to decisions Howard took early in the year after listening to the legitimate concerns of the community.

Our mid-year recovery in the polls was also confirmed by Labor's internal polling. Geoff Walsh told his colleagues about the Coalition comeback in the polls a few weeks before anyone had heard of the Tampa. This view comes from within other Labor circles too — Mark Bailey, an ALP Brisbane city councillor, wrote in the Courier Mail: "A myth has emerged that says Labor was a shoo-in before Tampa. We weren't. We were on course to lose ... We couldn't manage a 4.2% swing in the Aston by-election four months before a federal poll" (Courier Mail, 16 November 2001). Rather than propel a party behind in the polls to a lead in the polls, Tampa had the effect of reinforcing in the minds of the Australian people the major differences in leadership between Howard and his Government and Kim Beazley and the Labor Party.

Post election study

To understand where the election day movements occurred we conducted a post election polling study across sixteen key seats. That study reveals two particularly interesting things. The first is that among women of 18-34 years there was a 14% lift in our two party preferred vote. The second is that there was a 13% improvement in our vote amongst pensioners — a group that Labor said had been ravaged by the GST.

Factors behind a Liberal victory

Any accurate view of history should record that the Coalition victory on 10 November was due to several important factors:

• John Howard's leadership;
• The Government's strong economic and financial management credentials;
• The Government's strong stand in Australia's national interest to protect our borders;
• The professionalism of the Liberal Party team, its members and candidates at every level;
• A determination to focus on local issues of relevance;
• A demonstrated track record in Government of doing the right thing; and
• The certainty and stability that the Coalition offered in uncertain times.

More than anything else, the election was about leadership. Howard had shown time and again that he had the strength and determination to stand up for what he knows to be right. Tampa provided further evidence of this leadership strength. It reinforced an existing perception rather than creating a new one. People see Howard as consistent and steady — always prepared to stand his ground if he thinks it is to Australia's benefit. In an era of political cynicism this is a gold-like quality.

Beazley on the other hand was seen to be weak on issues — flip flopping on many — and voters were worried that he would not be able to stand up to others in his party if pressure was applied. This concern about him existed on many issues: work for the dole, private health insurance, the undue influence of trade unions as well as illegal entrants.

On economic management voters considered that the Government had done a good and responsible job. Moreover, given the uncertain international economic circumstances they felt that a steady hand on the economic levers was important. They were worried that Labor could push Australia back into debt especially with the many promises that were being made. They worried where the money was coming from and the debate about costings only made them more suspicious. Even "rollback" concerned voters. On the one hand, Beazley has talked it up for three years yet when it was released it was underwhelming. On the other hand, people were worried that if he was put under pressure he might rollback even further, creating uncertainty and complexity at a time when small businesses and families had accepted that the GST was now a part of life.

Howard and his Government represented safe hands. To quote one voter, "John Howard is in there at the moment, he's done a good job with all the big international and management issues. With a lot of uncertainty at the moment and a lot of things in the pipeline, we're better off sticking with Howard".

Labor and the election

Labor have boasted for the best part of a decade that they have superior campaign skills and stories were constantly run about the so-called strategists: Bob McMullan, John Faulkner, Stephen Smith and Wayne Swan. Ironically, their self-promotion only served to undermine their leader's standing, reinforcing that he needed to be propped up and suggesting that he really was not up to the task of leadership.

As usual Labor have attempted to rewrite history by briefing that they were set to win on the Wednesday before polling day but then the boat people issue re-emerged to dominate the agenda. This is plain wrong. Labor was stuck in a rut during the campaign. Their primary vote never exceeded 38% overall in any poll for the five weeks of the campaign in the 32 seats the Coalition polled.

In the Sydney Morning Herald Jennifer Hewett reported that during August Labor polling put them well ahead of the Government and that Labor's Geoff Walsh believed it would be tough for the Government to catch up the four to five points they were consistently behind Labor in the marginals, "no matter what Howard did" (Sydney Morning Herald, 15 November 2001). They must have been using Gary Morgan because the Coalition's polling in 20 of its marginal seats during August was nothing like this.

Labor's strategy was confusing. They started by focusing on education and began making an impact. Then suddenly they switched to the GST. Their advertising was described by voters as negative and undergraduate. It was advertising of another era that failed to reflect the context of the campaign. After 11 September the Coalition found that voters, uncertain and worried by events beyond their control, were looking for positive and reassuring messages from their political leaders. This extended to advertising where the harsh, negative retail advertising that Labor ran missed the mark. Any negative advertisements had to be low key, factually based and with little aggression. Labor's were shrill, misleading and juvenile.

Partly as a consequence of the Coalition's policy-driven victory in 1998, people are looking for political parties to believe in something. Having nothing substantive to offer, no concrete plan, no real policies, Labor turned to untruthful scare. Their radio advertisements were lies about the Government's position on tax reform and about Telstra. They were deliberately run on radio because they would not have been allowed to appear on television. Labor also extensively push polled. They rang people in their homes and told them lies about the GST and about Telstra. Coalition staff received hundreds of calls of complaint about this tactic. The use of this tactic suggests that radio commercials should be subject to the same criteria as television advertisements and that fines should be imposed for parties and companies that engage in push polling.

The campaign

It has been claimed that the Coalition's election material and advertising focussed on boat people to the exclusion of almost all domestic issues. This misses a key point. The issue of illegal entrants was one of several key issues but it was as much about leadership as the issue itself. Most of the Coalition's advertising focused on our achievements nationally and at a local level, its plans for the future and the strength of leadership needed to take the country forward. Many media commentators do not see much of the real campaign these days — it does not take place on the TV, on the radio or even in newspapers — because it is local activity on the ground that really counts: letters to voters, postcards, newsletters, telephone canvassing and doorknocking. At this level the issue of illegal entrants was only one of several key issues.

Factors influencing the vote

The Liberal's post election polling study helps us separate reality from rhetoric when it comes to the issues people voted on. When asked to give the number one reason why they voted for the Liberal Party:

• 29% of people who voted for the Liberal Party cited party reasons (either a longstanding commitment to the Liberal Party or opposition to the Labor Party);
• 22% cited economic and financial management;
• 18% cited Howard's leadership;
• 14% said they wanted the Government to continue along its current path (in effect endorsing its track record);
• 11% cited Beazley's leadership; and
• 10% cited illegal entrants / boat people.

Illegal entrants was a relevant issue used in Coalition advertising but it was not the exclusive issue of the campaign.

Leaving aside voters' general attitudes towards the Liberal Party the most important specific reason cited by voters for voting Liberal was its strength of economic and financial management. Next to economic management was the strength of Howard's leadership. Beazley's capacity to be Prime Minister was underscored not by his performance in relatively benign or controlled environments but by other occasions when the unexpected caught him out. An example of this prior to the campaign was the pressure he created for himself when he fudged the circumstances surrounding his daughter's hospital treatment and Labor was forced to blame a post caucus briefing for the problem. Beazley's responses in such circumstances found him wanting, and the public worried about how he would handle real difficulties. Nowhere was this more evident during the campaign than his response when, tragically, hundreds drowned after a boat sank in Indonesian waters. His reference to "failure of policy" and his subsequent obfuscation told people that he did not have the judgement or composure needed of a leader in tough times.

Reading a prepared text at a campaign launch or practicing and repeating a few cut through lines provided by others is one thing but a real leader needs to be able to handle the unexpected. Nothing voters saw during the campaign gave people the confidence that Beazley could. In Howard they saw a known quantity who held a strong set of values that guided his decision making. The Australian community knew that Howard would take a stand in the national interest just as he had done in response to the Port Arthur tragedy, East Timor and tax reform. A Coalition post election study revealed that for 57% of voters Howard was their preferred Prime Minister — a lead of 27% over Beazley and three times his lead over Beazley at the 1998 election.

Coverage of the people smugglers and illegal entrants issue often missed the point. For the majority of Australians it was about our right to protect our borders, sending a clear message to people smugglers and having proper processes in place for processing refugees. Far from setting one group of Australians against another, as has been argued by some, Howard's strong position is supported across the Australian "mainstream". 81% of voters from a Coalition election study believed that Labor should support the Government on the issue of illegal entrants and this includes 76% of Labor voters.

The mainstream includes the overwhelming number of proud newer Australians who have endorsed the Prime Minister's position. The Coalition post election study reveals that 73% of Australians from a non-English speaking background support the Government's border protection policies. 80% of voters believe that Australia should welcome refugees from any country of origin provided they go through the right processes. The study also found that 79% of Australians from a non-English speaking background believe the Labor Party should support the Government's position. This speaks volumes for the Prime Minister's ability to unite the country in these difficult and uncertain times.

The media

What has become clear, especially over the past few years, is that there is a widening gulf between many who consider themselves the opinion makers and those people who actually have the opinions. In the context of the election, 81% of voters thought the media seemed more interested in its own issues rather than the issues of importance to Australians generally. The earthquake theory of politics argues that there is one defining event, one moment, which changes the political landscape forever. Issues and events are thrown upside down and nothing can ever be the same. There are those who see Tampa as one such event. I do not. I have heard the emphatic claims before about how an event had reshaped politics. I well remember when Cheryl Kernot defected to Labor. The earthquake theorists were alive and well then. Headlines blared "Cheryl for PM". One commentator said "Kernot's party switch clearly changed the fundamentals of Australian politics". We all know what has happened to Cheryl now.

The same earthquake theory was adopted early in the year at the time of the Ryan by-election. One commentator said that the Ryan by-election "has so lengthened the odds about a Government victory in the federal election this year that it is fitting to start assessing Howard's mixed and complex legacy". Another told us in May that "the Liberal Party, founded by Menzies and inspired by Deakin, is at a crossroads and potentially in crisis, contemplating one of its worst defeats and the risk that it will be reduced to a rump unless something is done now, and done boldly, to arrest the slide". The Coalition was in trouble earlier in the year and had the election been held then, it would have been very tough.

I have always subscribed to the evolutionary theory of politics: that political outcomes are determined by a series of cumulative events. One event does not generally create an overwhelming overall difference, rather it incrementally reshapes or reinforces views. The Prime Minister alluded to this point himself back in March when he leant across the chamber and told Beazley that "it may be easy pickings today, but there will come a time when you actually have to tell the Australian people what you stand for". Politics is a marathon and Beazley and Labor were found wanting when it mattered.

Labor post election

What was the Labor Party's response to their third successive federal election defeat? Labor's idea of generational change has been to replace as their leader the 53 year old son of a former Whitlam Minister with the 52 year old son of a former Whitlam Minister. This same man once headed up the ACTU, along with Martin Ferguson and now Jenny George and he reinforces the absolute dominance of the union movement over the ALP. The message to Simon Crean is a simple one that resonates deeply with the Australian community: you cannot proclaim to represent all Australians when you are owned by a minority of them.

In the Coalition's post election study 72% of all voters, including 55% of Labor voters, believed the Labor Party should reform itself and reduce trade union power. Further still, 53% of voters believe a former ACTU head should not lead the Labor Party. Furthermore, 70% of all voters believe that Labor should accept that the GST is a part of life now and move on. 85% of voters also believed that the Labor Party should release its policies earlier, not a few weeks before an election. The same number believes that the Labor Party needs to explain to the Australian people what it stands for.

The Australian Democrats: A lost opportunity

In the 2001 election the Australian Democrats fared poorly. Coalition post election research found that only 20% of voters said the Democrats ran an effective campaign whilst 72% said their campaign was ineffective. Given that the motivation for the Democrats to change leaders was said to be Natasha Stott Despoja's popularity and media image it would be concerning to the Democrats to note that even 55% of Democrat voters said their party ran an ineffective campaign.

What is more interesting is the fact that voters did not take kindly to the Democrats preference deal with Labor. 71% of voters said the Democrats should be a truly independent party and should not do preference deals with any of the major parties. Only 23% agreed with arriving at such an arrangement. Coalition research found that voters are confused about what the Democrats stand for under Stott Despoja's leadership. 94% of voters said the Democrats need to tell people what they stand for, 86% said they wanted to see more policy substance from the Democrats rather than a focus on personalities and 72% believed they should support the Government's stance on illegal entrants. It will long be remembered that a vote for the Democrats in 2001 was a vote for Beazley and the Labor Party. The preference deal the Democrats negotiated with Labor was designed to hand Government to them.

Who won the campaign?

The answer to this question can be found in those voters who made up their minds during the course of the campaign. Our research found that during the course of the campaign more people chose the Coalition than chose the ALP. 50% of Liberal voters made up their mind after the election was called compared with 46% of Labor voters, thus indicating the impact of the campaign in converting voters to the Liberal Party. Coalition research revealed that Labor's claim that Beazley won the campaign is disputed by voters. 82% of voters polled in key seats believe that the Liberal Party ran a convincing campaign (44% very; 38% somewhat). Just 48% of voters believe that Labor ran an effective campaign (12% very; 37% somewhat) and more (50%) thought Labor's campaign was ineffective. Even 40% of Labor voters believe Labor ran an ineffective campaign.

As in 1998, a significant proportion of voters in this election made their voting decision in the final stages of the campaign. 14% of voters made their mind up on polling day itself: 9% in the booth and 5% on the day but before entering the booth. This reinforces the importance of communicating messages to the very end. Howard's press club performance and continuing discipline, coupled with the coordination that the Coalition's campaign displayed with polling booth dressing and messages, helped lock away votes for it. In contrast, Labor had different election day wraps and signs in virtually every state.

The way ahead

Since 1996 the Coalition has been entrusted with Government by the people of Australia. That right carries with it the equal responsibility to constantly work hard to maintain that trust. Howard knows better than most his obligation. Whilst the result federally has been strong, results in some states have been disappointing. At a national level the Coalition does not hold any seats in Tasmania, and despite receiving a swing nationally of over 2% it was unable to pick up the seat of Bass with its margin of 0.1%.

There is a need for the Liberal Party organisation to continue to reform itself over the next three years. It needs to establish a set of benchmarks for its candidates and divisional bodies to achieve. It must continue to promote a career path for people to work within the organisation. It must ensure that its membership continues to be built up and revitalised. This historic victory was due to the foundations laid by Howard and his team over five years in Government. The Coalition has been entrusted with Government by the Australian people and will continue to work hard to deliver on its third term agenda and ensure Australia is kept in safe hands.

Lynton Crosby, Federal Director, Liberal Party of Australia

Originally published in John Warhurst and Marian Simms (eds), 2001: The Centenary Election, St Lucia, UQP, 2002.