Belonging to Country — A Philosophical Anthropology

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Over the past three to four decades Australians have been undergoing a radical reassessment of their relationship with the land and each other. In recent times, non-Indigenous Australians have been exposed to a number of shocking revelations about the country’s colonial and more recent past. As a consequence, the quest to find out who ‘we’ are and how ‘we’ ought to live has gathered increasing relevance and urgency. These questions have enlivened public debate concerning Australian national identity; debate that is now both commonplace and heated.

The impetus for this paper is an issue at the heart of that debate: the question of who truly belongs to and in Australia. ‘Belonging’ has become an increasingly prominent term in academic and broader discussions about Australian national identity. Indeed, the question of who properly belongs to this country — Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal — is a highly politicised and contested national issue. Belonging has been recognised as having strong currency in both a legal and a moral sense.

However, despite the extraordinary investment made in the notion of belonging and its prevalence in popular, academic and political discourses, there is very little attention paid to explicating or theorising the concept itself. One aim of this paper is to address this lack; however, a stronger focus is placed upon the belonging of Australia’s non-Indigenous population — specifically, settler Australians. How legitimate are settler claims to belonging to this land? How accurate are those protagonists — both Indigenous and non-Indigenous — who deny the very possibility of such belonging?

The approach I take is philosophical, but not in the sense that it appeals to rights or duties — whether legal or moral. Instead, I provide an exposition of the notion of belonging itself, hoping that by doing so we are better equipped to judge how and when the term is most appropriately applied. To this end, the paper employs the thinking of nineteenth century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard offers a philosophical anthropology of being-in-the-world from which I draw the notion of ‘belonging qua correct relation’.

After briefly discussing the significance that ‘belonging’ has assumed in contemporary Australia, the paper falls loosely into two parts. The first attempts to develop formally the philosophical theory of belonging qua correct relation; the second examines the position of settler Australians in this context. In this process, a conceptual apparatus is constructed to help improve understanding of what it means to belong to and in Australia and to provide a greater insight into ourselves in our quest for belonging.
What is at Issue?

Given recent revelations about the colonial occupation of this land and the dispossession and oppression of the Indigenous population, it is understandable that many settler Australians feel guilty, shameful or sorry. What is less predictable, and more difficult to comprehend, is the tenor of other attitudes that have ensued. What has become increasingly evident in the non-Indigenous population is an intensified self-consciousness, which in some cases has resulted in an insecurity reaching hysterical levels.

Such emotions are evident in Pauline Hanson’s now infamous maiden speech to Parliament, in which she stated:

I am fed up with being told ‘This is our land’. Well, where the hell do I go? I was born here, and so were my parents and children … I draw the line when told I must pay and continue paying for something that happened over 200 years ago. Like most Australians I worked for my land: no one gave it to me.4

Here Hanson asserts the belonging of settler Australians, particularly those of Anglo-Celtic origin, as a given — bestowed either by land ownership, immediate birthright, ancestry or a sense of nationalism. I suggest that her statement, affirming that the Australian land belongs to one specific group of non-Indigenous Australians, and rejecting Indigenous claims of ownership, veils a desperate fear of illegitimacy and alienation from the ‘home’. However, I also argue further, and more controversially, that this same anxiety is shared by those whose position on the matter is far more popular, more ‘sexy’ and more politically correct.

The group of Australians that hold this position are radical opponents of Hansonism. They are much more sceptical about their right to a sense of belonging in this country and are ambivalent about their non-Indigenous status. Among these thinkers some suggest that the existential angst and guilt felt by many non-Indigenous Australians at this time is the natural consequence of a postcolonial consciousness, and, further, that such feelings are not only warranted, but redemptive. Others in this group share more extreme views and espouse the attitude that non-Indigenous peoples, unlike Aboriginal Australians, will never be entitled to make authentic claims of belonging to this land.

I mean neither to support one stance nor mock the other. Rather, my concern is that while the former position — the position of those who feel their belonging rivals Aboriginal claims — is summarily dismissed as racist or denounced as neo-fascist, the latter — the position of those who feel they do not, or perhaps can never, properly belong because of Aboriginal claims — is frequently embraced almost completely without challenge. While troubling attitudes like those encapsulated in Pauline Hanson’s rhetoric deserve scrutiny, we ought to be equally concerned with and attentive to the views of those who unequivocally deny any hope of belonging for non-Indigenous peoples.

Defining Belonging

The question of who does or can truly belong in and to Australia is problematic, not only because of its socio-political implications. The dilemma is also one of definition or conceptualisation. There is considerable disagreement as to what kind of criteria might be used to measure correctly the phenomena of belonging,
and there is an absence of conceptual apparatus by which ‘belonging’ itself and thus ‘true belonging’ might be grasped.

One thing that is indicated by the binary of opinions about who truly belongs in the contemporary Australian context is that who does or does not belong is not clearly ascertained by appealing to individual feelings on the matter. In the debate over belonging, what is being contested is not the sincerity with which various commentators state convictions about their own belonging but, rather, whether these convictions are accurate. That is to say no one doubts the fact that some people feel they belong, while others feel they do not. What is at issue here is whether or not, regardless of those feelings, they actually do or do not truly belong. Two implications stem from this assertion: first, what it is to belong is not merely to have a sense or feeling of belonging; second, belonging is a state of being that in some sense is independent of those feelings. As such, the task at hand is to find a way of defining and explaining belonging in-itself.

I now take it to be the case that belonging proper is something much deeper than that which pure emotion can guarantee; it has to be something rather more ontological — something more fundamental to who and what we are. That does not mean, however, that belonging must be regarded as some additional criteria pertaining to who and what we are. Rather, it might be stated that belonging is in some way part of what constitutes our identity, whether we are explicitly aware of it or not.

This talk of ‘we’ and ‘our’ is not to be interpreted as accidental. This use of this pronoun and its possessive form is both important and unavoidable, not merely because of the universality of the topic under discussion (at least the possibility of belonging as something we might all potentially possess ought not be overlooked), but also because it is the ‘we’ and the ‘us’ that are fundamentally at stake here. What concerns me is what it means for any of us, any of us for whom this can arise as a question (whether ‘we’ be ‘me’, the scholarly community or any other stakeholder). That question also involves what the meaning of ‘we’ and ‘us’ might be, since to use these pronouns is already to assume an identity and a belonging — such an assumption cannot be avoided, but it can be questioned, interrogated and explored.

One logical place to start the formal development of a philosophical theory of belonging is with an examination of how the notion is ordinarily employed. Thus we might begin to define belonging by sketching out the various senses in which it is used in common parlance. Immediately, three ‘senses’ of belonging seem apparent: first, the sense of belonging that refers us to social connections, to a sense of connection to a particular community of people; second, the sense of belonging that refers us to historical connections, to a sense of connection to our past or to a particular tradition; third, a sense of belonging that refers us to geographical connections, to a sense of connection to a particular locality or dwelling place.

One of the things suggested by the way we employ the notion is that belonging is a state of being in which we are related to the world in any one or more of these three senses. On the face of it then, we all belong in some sense, for we are all connected or given over to the world in which we live — to some extent we are all in relationship with our communities, our histories and our localities. But what
we mean by belonging is something more than this. The connection that is implied in all these senses of belonging is not merely one in which the subject stands in some relation to its object but, rather, what is at issue here is a particular kind of relation; the sort of relation in which we ourselves are implicated, the sort of relation in which who and what we are is at issue. Belonging is a state of being from which wellbeing is derived; a relation that makes us feel good about our being and our being-in-the-world; a relation that is fitting, right or correct. This being the case, a minimum conception of belonging might be understood as standing in correct relation to one’s community, one’s history and one’s locality.

I say ‘minimum conception’ because, when put like this, belonging qua correct relation might be regarded an uncontroversial definition and, as such, of limited value in furthering our understanding of the notion in itself. After all, I am yet to establish how belonging discloses itself. What is its nature? How is it to be recognised? Is it a passive or active notion? Is it something that just happens to us, or is it something we must create for ourselves? All that I argue so far is that belonging is some kind of relation; obviously not just a relation of any kind; rather a relation to something; a relation that is thought of as in some way correct. As we will see later, however, while belonging is usually taken to be a correct relation to something exterior — like one’s community, history or locality — I am going to argue that there is much more to it than that. For the moment, however, I beg the reader’s indulgence to leave these questions aside, and to move forward with the minimal definition of belonging that I have just offered. This is intended only to act as a useful starting point. All the work now is directed towards a better understanding of what correct relation can be taken to mean.

The Kierkegaardian Notion of Correct Relation

The notion of correct relation is quite significant in Kierkegaard’s authorship. In Kierkegaard’s account, correct relation denotes the quintessential mode of being human — a mode of being in which all aspects of the self, as human, are perfectly integrated — a mode of being in which we are as we ought to be: fully ourselves. Correct relation, in Kierkegaard’s thinking, involves both knowing and being a certain way — having what Kierkegaard would term transparency and being what I name authentic.

Both transparency and authenticity are, in one sense, preconditions of correct relation and, in another, consequences of it. That is to say, both transparency and authenticity are necessary features of being correctly related, but it is also the case that in achieving correct relation transparency and authenticity are also achieved. In order to understand the logos of correct relation as Kierkegaard deploys it, the roles and natures of these two interconnected concepts require closer examination.

Although Kierkegaard fails to provide an explicit definition of what he means by transparency, his strategic utilisation of the concept throughout his work attests to its epistemological and ontological significance. First, transparency denotes that for which there exists the necessary light for disclosure. To be transparent is to ‘have a clarity that creates the possibility of seeing into something’ and thus knowing the truth of it. However, for Kierkegaard to know the truth of any
situation, to be transparent to anything at all, involves first knowing oneself.\(^8\) Thus, transparency is not only an attitude toward being, but also an attitude of being. Transparency is self-knowledge. That is to say, transparency involves; a condition of the self as conscious of its own ontological condition \textit{qua} true being. This is where the connection between transparency and the condition that I have named authenticity — between knowing and being — is made.

The notion of authenticity relates to subjective truth. The assertion ‘Subjectivity is truth’\(^9\) lies at the very heart of Kierkegaard’s philosophy, and also at the centre of much misinterpretation of his thought. This assertion is not, as it is often taken to be, one of general epistemological relativism. That is to say, Kierkegaard does not hold to the position expressed in the aphorism: ‘If you believe something to be true, [that you belong perhaps] then it is, in any case, true for you’. Rather, what he asserts is that truth is actualised only when it is immersed in personal experience. Put differently, truth is disclosed always and only through the knowing and being of the embodied subject.\(^10\) Truth is not merely something to be believed. It is something to be lived. An authentic human being is one who knows oneself — has transparency — and lives according to subjective truth. To be such a person is to be in correct relation and thus, following my thesis on the matter, to belong.

It is clear that, as Kierkegaard would have it, the ground of our belonging is ontological — that is, belonging is a condition of the self. But it must be noted — and Kierkegaard would insist that it was — that the self does not exist independently of the life it lives or of the world it lives in. That is to say, the living self belongs in and to the world in which it is located. Indeed, what it is to be a self that belongs is, by Kierkegaard’s account, to be a self which is correctly related to the world in which it dwells. Kierkegaard expresses this through a philosophical anthropology in which the self is a synthesis constituted by the finite and the infinite.\(^11\)

The finite is the part of a person given to them by virtue of their concrete worldly existence, including such things as those which are genetically inherited like sex, race and personal appearance. But the finite also includes talents, dispositions and inclinations and also weaknesses and vices,\(^12\) things that are not only determined by genetic heritage, but by the cultural, political and social milieu in which a person is immersed. The infinite aspect of the self, on the other hand, is not merely given to us by the facts of our lives, so to speak. Rather, the infinite represents possibility — an ideal. An ideal self is a self able to be its most functional, shine its brightest, overcome its flaws and curb its vices.

The ideal self of correct relation is a self that has integrity. Integrity, in this account, can be taken to mean several different things: first, self-integrity involves a person integrating various parts of themselves into a harmonious, intact whole; second, to act as a self with integrity is to act in a way that accurately reflects your sense of who you are, to act from motives, interests and commitments that are most deeply your own;\(^13\) third, self-integrity is taken to have a moral purpose.\(^14\) That is, those who have integrity are taken to live in a more ethical relation to themselves and others.

219
The definition of belonging *qua* correct relation that I have just outlined is consistent with the way we normally think about the notion of belonging. When we say we belong, what we are referring to is a sense of ease or accord with who we are in-ourselves — that is true. But by reference to the notion belonging we are also expressing a sense of accord with the various physical and social contexts in which our lives are lived out. Belonging is to be in accordance with who we are in ourselves as well as who we are in the-world. The articulated senses of belonging I first encountered refer us to objects that are in some sense external to us (community, history and locality). Nevertheless, it is also true — and clear to us when we say we belong in any of these senses — that each also refers us back to ourselves as subjects.

**Diagnosing Despair**

Having developed the theory of belonging *qua* correct relation in abstract terms, I now apply this thesis to the issue at hand: the belonging of non-Indigenous Australians. How far can it be said that this group of Australians has a basis on which to claim belonging? According to the account that I have just given, the fundamental prerequisite for belonging is transparency. That is, that individuals are able to see themselves as they really are and where they come from (in other words, they must know the finite aspects of themselves). For it is only then that authenticity, and by extension, belonging, becomes a possibility. Any investigation into the condition of belonging must therefore begin by determining how far settler Australians fulfil the criteria of transparency with themselves and their worldly inheritance.

The intention of this paper is not to provide a detailed or comprehensive survey regarding the transparency of non-Indigenous Australians. Nor do I think that such a survey is necessary to persuade the reader that there is probably due cause to question claims by settler Australians that they belong — at least they may not belong in the sense that I have articulated. One indicator of this is the fact that, although popular access to a revised socio-historical account provides the opportunity for most Australians to develop transparency with more honest accounts of their being in this land, the identity that many settler Australians have adopted pays little regard to this model of a post-colonial approach. They either do not recognise themselves as the selves disclosed in revisionist accounts, or have failed to act in the light of that knowledge. In other words, they have failed to seize the opportunity to come into correct relation; to become who and what they ideally are; to belong.

Put another way, there appears to be enough evidence to support the case for what Kierkegaard might call a pathology of spirit in Australian being. That is to say, there is sufficient evidence to support the fact that it is likely that many Australians may be suffering from the existential condition of misrelation — a mode of existence that Kierkegaard names ‘despair’. Despair is the opposite of correct relation — the opposite of belonging. It is a pathological state of being in which the individual is not properly connected to others or themselves. In Kierkegaard’s understanding, despair is a condition constituted by a failing of the self to be itself — to achieve a sense of identity that has authenticity. In these
terms, despair is not merely a psychological state or feeling that can be attributed to a loss of hope, rather, the feeling might be more accurately regarded as an indicator. What it points to is the ontological condition of the same name.

Kierkegaard presents a detailed taxonomy of despair as an ontological condition in which he distinguishes between two types and two basic forms. First, he distinguishes between different types of despair by employing the condition of consciousness. For Kierkegaard, consciousness is linked to knowledge and, in particular, to self-knowledge. Unconscious despair is marked by a lack of awareness of one's self as misrelated. Conscious despair refers to an awakening to the truth of one's condition. Therefore, and paradoxically, in existential terms, to be consciously despairing is both a positive and a negative. On the one hand, to be aware of misrelation is to be in a position to correct it. On the other, the greater degree of transparency to one's condition, the more anxiety. To be aware of one's pathological state is always to suffer some degree of psychological pain.

This paper argues that an increasing proportion of settler Australians are in a state of conscious despair. That is, an increasing number of those born and raised in settler culture have begun to suffer from the anxiety of misrelation. It argues further that this Australian angst stems from the increasing degree of transparency achieved by the promulgation of revisionist accounts of colonial processes. I think it can also be said that in the light of this new and sometimes shocking information about themselves, non-Indigenous Australians are attempting to reconstruct what they perceive as a new and more authentic identity.

Kierkegaard’s ontology anticipates such a reaction. Once a person is awakened to existential misrelation, their response is to despair of themselves; they want to get rid of that misrelated self. This, according to Kierkegaard, is the formula for all despair: not wanting to be who one is. Paradoxically though, to not want to be yourself in misrelation is also to want to be yourself in some other state. Thus, not willing to be oneself and willing to be oneself are just two sides of the same coin. I think there is evidence of both these responses of despair in the Australian context. However, there is one specific manifestation of despair that particularly draws my attention and which, in my observation, is increasingly prevalent among non-Indigenous Australians — especially the “well-educated”.

Despairingly unwilling to be ourselves

Since the 1970s, the majority of Australians have developed a growing awareness of how Aboriginal peoples belong to the land. They are now more familiar with those notions encompassed by the Dreaming complex, that is, Aboriginal understandings of community, country and Law. They are cognizant of the fundamental principles and mechanisms by which Aboriginal peoples belong, even though they may not be familiar with the details of that mode of existence. Indeed ‘traditional’, if not contemporary, Aboriginal life and thought has become for Australians, not only a source of national pride and admiration, but in some quarters the source of national envy.

As a consequence, a not insubstantial group of non-Indigenous Australians has sought to establish belonging by means of appropriating Indigenous modes. Just as Martin Mulligan argues that in order to re-enchant our ecological sensibilities we need to build a kind of ‘whitefella dreaming’, David Tacey and James Cowan argue, in their different ways, that Aboriginal religion might provide the panacea to the spiritual emptiness evident in non-Indigenous Australia. Yet
another author who pays homage to these notions is Peter Read. Known for his part in bringing Aboriginal history to national attention, Read has more recently focused his research on the impact of such disclosure on non-Aboriginal Australians. How have settler Australians coped with his revelations? How do they feel about their relationship with the land now? How can they belong? Read’s research, and very personal quest for a sense of belonging, led him to the conclusion that non-Indigenous Australians can belong, but that this can only be achieved by ‘sharing’ the history and belonging of their Aboriginal counterparts in very intimate fashion. In his latest work, *Belonging: Australians: Place and Aboriginal Ownership*, Read finds his own sense of the ‘native-born’ by means of a journey through ‘country’ with his own ‘shadow brother’ Dennis Foley.

Although varying in style and focus, the work of the aforementioned authors is similar in their suggestion that non-Indigenous Australia form a closer alliance with the life and thought of Aboriginal peoples, and that in doing so their sense of alienation and estrangement in this land will be ameliorated. Such advice, however, ought to be viewed critically and with extreme caution. Not only does it bear remarkable resemblance to a more negative form of cultural appropriation, that which plunders Aboriginal material culture for the advancement of unscrupulous operators, examples of which receive all round condemnation, but, according to the imperatives of belonging qua correct relation, it is also a misplaced exercise. Given that the key principle employed by this philosophical anthropology is that individuals know themselves, any model of identity that relies upon appropriation of an ‘other’ in order to achieve self-authentication is, by definition, structurally flawed. That a model of this latter variety is offered, Kierkegaard might say, merely confirms a despair condition, that is, it is indicative of despair of the type that results in not willing to be oneself. Rather than the means by which settler Australians might find their proper place in relation to this country, the call to non-Indigenous Australia to ‘Aboriginalise’ in order to establish ‘belonging’ can be regarded not only as symptomatic of a misrelation to where we come from and who we are, but a re-affirmation of that misrelation.

**Conclusion**

What are the implications of the philosophical approach I have taken to answer the question of who truly belongs to this country? The aim of this paper was not only to provide a more coherent framework by which the notion of belonging could be more meaningfully understood but also, in doing so, to provide ontological grounds on which the belonging of non-Aboriginal Australians could be more meaningfully assessed. By mobilising the notion of belonging qua correct relation, I believe that I have come some way in achieving both of these objectives.

Much earlier I posed, but then retreated from, the question of what kind of phenomenon ‘belonging’ is. According to my research, belonging in-itself is not a feeling of wellbeing — although such feelings may be associated with it; nor is it something given to us by right or privilege — although in some sense it is understandable that we regard it as any one of these. Insofar as we do, it is because belonging, as I have defined it, is a mode or state of being that represents the ideal condition in which a human can dwell.
On these terms, belonging is about a certain kind of deportment in the world, a way of being that, ideally, is related to the common spheres of our belonging (community, history and locality) and thus to whom and what we are. Such a state of being is not something that just happens; it is something we must create for ourselves. Thus the struggle for belonging can be understood as the task of becoming selves that have both transparency and authenticity in regard to where one comes from and who one is.

If we take the philosophical theory of belonging *qua* correct relation seriously, there exists due cause to question claims by settler Australians that they truly belong. Indeed, I argue that among settler Australians existential misrelation is quite common, whether they are aware of it or not. Among those who have become aware of their condition, and experience the anxiety that ensues, one particular response has come to my attention.

Although Kierkegaard sees conscious despair as a positive thing, viewing it as an opportunity to develop authentically, a certain group of Australians have chosen another route — that of determining not to be themselves. Somewhat paradoxically, these are the same people who most would think are best situated to take the opportunity to become themselves more fully. They are generally well educated, informed and thoughtful in matters pertaining to national history and identity. However, even by attempting to integrate the life histories and identities of Aboriginal Australians into their own, this particular group has embraced, rather than ameliorated, their despair. All hope is not lost; the formula for belonging *qua* correct relation remains constant and clear.

According to that formula, it is no good for Australians — neither those from settler cultures nor those from Indigenous cultures — to settle for the outcomes of Australia’s colonial past. Nor can the legacy of past relations be overcome by either non-Indigenous or Aboriginal Australians willing themselves away — becoming something or someone else. Belonging is only achieved by embracing oneself as who and what one properly is. For settler Australians this means attending to the selves that they are by virtue of their own particular heredity, history or locality, but also by pursuing a commitment to integrity. Such self-integrity must be demonstrated not only in the unity and wholeness of settler Australians’ identities, but also in their demeanour as moral agents in the world. If we are able to accomplish this, only then shall we properly belong — not only in the contemporary Australian context under discussion here, but wherever and whenever we dwell.
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1 For example, in the findings of the 1991 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, the High Court’s rejection of the doctrine of *terra nullius* in 1992, and the 1997 National Inquiry into the Stolen Generations as well as a plethora of revisionist histories.

2 For the purposes of this paper the adjectives ‘non-Indigenous’ and ‘settler’ are used interchangeably to denote non-Aboriginality. The terms ‘Indigenous’ and ‘Aboriginal’ are also used interchangeably and in juxtaposition to non-Aboriginal. That the paper employs such a simple binary between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians in its analysis of belonging to country is explicit. Despite the fact that the Australian socio-cultural milieu is far more complex and the discourse on contested belonging far more nuanced than this binary suggests, the schema is taken up quite deliberately; first, to imitate popular conceptions of the debate, and second, in recognition of the prevalence of precisely this juxtaposition whenever ‘belonging’ is treated in scholarly works as an Aboriginal issue.

3 An increasing number of academics argue that non-Aboriginal Australians can never belong to this country — at least, not in the same way as its Indigenous population. See, for example, Peter Read, ‘Four Historians’, *Belonging: Australians, Place and Aboriginal Ownership*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp 172-97.
4 Pauline Hanson is the leader of the radical right political party now called ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation’. The agenda of the party is seen by many as blatantly racist. Hanson’s maiden speech to parliament, made on September 10, 1996, graphically demonstrates this. It can be found in full at a number of websites including: http://members.ozemail.com.au/~grahamjg/issues/hspeech.htm.

5 The term ‘correct relation’ is not explicitly used by Kierkegaard. Rather, he refers to the condition that is its opposite, that is, misrelation. For Kierkegaard, the self is constituted by a ‘synthesis that relates itself to itself’. There can be either misrelation or, as I put it, correct relation, in the relation of the synthesis. See Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death: a Christian psychological exposition for upbuilding and awakening, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980, Part 1, Section A, pp 13-21.

6 Again, Kierkegaard does not use this term. Rather, he refers to its antithesis: inauthenticity. To be inauthentic is for Kierkegaard to be a self in ‘misrelation’ or ‘despair’. ibid, p 14.

7 Julia Watkin, Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy, Scarecrow Press, Maryland, 2001, p 258.

8 For example, in Kierkegaard, op cit, p 14 and Soren Kierkegaard, Stages on Life’s Way, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988, p 483, Kierkegaard uses the term ‘transparency’ to mean self-understanding.


11 Kierkegaard gives a detailed ontology of the self in The Sickness, op cit, p 29-42. It is here that he examines despair as it arises as a misrelation in the various synthetic expressions of the self. For a comprehensive discussion of Kierkegaard’s notion of the self as synthesis see John W. Elrod, ‘The dialectical Self’, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1975, p 29-71.


15 ‘Spirit’ is the term that Kierkegaard uses to denote authentic selfhood.


17 Rudd, op cit, p 81.

18 See Kierkegaard, The Sickness, Part I, op cit. It is important to note that neither of these responses have the effect of ameliorating the pathological state that they are seeking to escape.

19 See Read’s claim in this regard in Read, op cit, p 5.


24 The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation also hold that the means by which settler Australians might find belonging to this country is through closer identification with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ culture and history. See Indigenous Law Resources, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/car/1993/4/index.html.

25 Read, loc cit.

26 ibid.

27 Rolls, op cit, p 117.